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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of detecting a high dimensional signal (not necessarily sparse)
based on compressed measurements with physical layer secrecy guarantees. First, we propose a col-
laborative compressive detection (CCD) framework to compensate for the performance loss due to
compression with a single sensor. We characterize the trade-off between dimensionality reduction
achieved by a universal compressive sensing (CS) based measurement scheme and the achievable
performance of CCD analytically. Next, we consider a scenario where the network operates in the
presence of an eavesdropper who wants to discover the state of the nature being monitored by the
system. To keep the data secret from the eavesdropper, we propose to use cooperating trustworthy nodes
that assist the fusion center (FC) by injecting artificial noise to deceive the eavesdropper. We seek the
answers to the questions: Does CS help improve the security performance in such a framework? What
are the optimal values of parameters which maximize the CS based collaborative detection performance
at the FC while ensuring perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper?
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Compressive sensing (CS) is a new paradigm which enables the reconstruction of compressible
or sparse signals using far fewer samples than required by the Nyquist criterion [1], [2]. In
this framework, a small collection of linear random projections of a sparse signal contains
sufficient information for signal recovery. To reconstruct the original signal from its compressed
measurements, several algorithms have been proposed in the literature [3].
While CS mostly deals with complete signal reconstruction, there are several signal processing
applications where complete signal recovery is not necessary. Instead we might be only interested
in solving inference problems such as detection, classification or estimation of certain parameters.
To solve an inference problem where some prior information about the signal is available, a cus-
tomized measurement scheme could be implemented such that the optimal inference performance
is achieved for the particular signal. As an example, for a signal detection problem where the
signal of interest is known, the optimal design is the matched filter which is dependent on the
signal itself. However, it is possible that the signal that we wish to infer about may evolve over
time. Thus, we are often interested in universal or agnostic design. A few attempts have been
made in this direction to address the problems of inference in Compressive Signal Processing
(CSP) literature in recent research [4]–[6]. CSP techniques are universal and agnostic to the
signal structure and provide deterministic guarantees for a wide variety of signal classes.
The authors in [4], [7], [8] considered the deterministic signal detection problem in the
compressed measurement domain where the performance limits of detection with compressed
measurements were investigated. For signals that are not necessarily sparse, it was shown that a
certain performance loss will be incurred due to compression when compared to the optimal test
that acquires original measurements using the traditional measurement scheme. For stochastic
signals, the compressive detection problem (i.e., detecting stochastic signals in the compressed
measurement domain) was considered in [6], [9]. Both works focused only on compressive
detection of ‘zero-mean’ stochastic signals based on observations corrupted by additive noise.
Closed form expressions were derived for performance limits and performance loss due to
compression was characterized analytically. A signal classification problem based on compressed
measurements was considered in [10] where the authors developed a manifold based model for
compressive classification. The authors in [11], [12] studied the performance of compressive
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3sampling in detection and classification setup and introduced the generalized restricted isometry
property that states that the angle between two vectors is preserved under random projections.
Sparse event detection by sensor networks under a CS framework was considered in [13]. The
problem of detection of spectral targets based on noisy incoherent projections was addressed
in [14]. Schemes for the design and optimization of projection matrices for signal detection with
compressed measurements have been proposed in [15]–[18].
As mentioned earlier, CSP techniques are universal and agnostic to the signal structure and,
therefore, are attractive in many practical applications. Despite its attractiveness to solve high
dimensional inference problems, CSP suffers from a few major drawbacks which limit its
applicability in practice. A CS based measurement scheme incurs a certain performance loss due
to compression when compared to the traditional measurement scheme while detecting non sparse
signals. This can be seen as the price one pays for universality in terms of inference performance.
In this paper, we propose a collaborative compressive detection (CCD) framework to compensate
for the performance loss due to compression. The CCD framework comprises of a group of
spatially distributed nodes which acquire vector observations regarding the phenomenon of
interest. Nodes send a compressed summary of their observations to the Fusion Center (FC) where
a global decision is made. In this setup, we characterize the trade-off between dimensionality
reduction in a universal CS based measurement scheme and the achievable performance. In our
preliminary work [19], we analyzed the problem only for the deterministic signal case. In the
current work, we significantly extend our previous work and investigate the problem for two
different cases: 1) when the signal of interest is deterministic and 2) when the signal of interest
is random. It is worthwhile to point out that, in contrast to [6], [9] where compressive detection
of ‘zero-mean’ stochastic signals was considered, we study a more general problem with ‘non
zero-mean’ stochastic signals. Note that, some of these existing results can be seen as a special
case of analytical results derived in this paper. For both the cases, we show that for a fixed
signal to noise ratio (SNR), if the number of collaborating nodes is greater than (1/c), where
0 ≤ c ≤ 1 is the compression ratio, the loss due to compression can be recovered.
In a CCD framework, the FC receives compressive observation vectors from the nodes and
makes the global decision about the presence of the signal vector. The transmissions by the
nodes, however, may be observed by an eavesdropper. The secrecy of a detection system against
eavesdropping attacks is of utmost importance [20]. In a fundamental sense, there are two motives
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4for any eavesdropper (Eve), namely selfishness and maliciousness, to compromise the secrecy of a
given inference network. For instance, some of the nodes within a cognitive radio network (CRN)
may selfishly take advantage of the FC’s inferences and may compete against the CRN in using
the primary user’s channels without paying any participation costs to the network moderator. In
another example, if the radar decisions are leaked to a malicious aircraft, the adversary aircraft
can maliciously adapt its strategy against a given distributed radar network accordingly so as to
remain invisible to the radar and in clandestine pursuit of its mission. Therefore, in the recent
past, there has been a lot of interest in the research community in addressing eavesdropping
attacks on inference networks. Recently, a few attempts have been made to address the problem
of eavesdropping threats on distributed detection network. However, a similar study in a CSP
framework is missing from the literature.
Next, we investigate the CCD problem when the network operates in the presence of an
eavesdropper who wants to discover the state of the nature being monitored by the system. While
security issues with CS based measurement schemes have been considered in [21]–[23], our work
is considerably different. In contrast to [21]–[23], where performance limits of secrecy of CS
based measurement schemes were analyzed (under different assumptions), we look at the problem
from a practical perspective. We pursue a more active approach where the problem of optimal
system design with secrecy guarantees is studied in an optimization setup. More specifically, we
propose to use cooperating trustworthy nodes that assist the FC by injecting artificial noise to
deceive the eavesdroppers to improve the security performance of the system. The addition of
artificial noise to node transmissions is a data falsification scheme that is employed to confuse
the eavesdropper. We consider the problem of determining optimal system parameters which
maximize the detection performance at the FC, while ensuring perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper
(information of the eavesdropper is exactly zero). In the process of determining optimal system
parameters, we seek the answer to the question: Does compression help in improving the security
performance of the system? At first glance, it seems intuitive that compression should always
improve the security performance. However, we show that this argument is not necessarily true.
In fact, security performance of the system is independent of the compression ratio in the perfect
secrecy regime.
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5A. Main Contributions
Our work presented in this paper is motivated by a number of factors. First, CS based
measurement schemes incur a certain performance loss due to compression when compared to
traditional measurement schemes while detecting non sparse signals, and, therefore, techniques to
mitigate this loss are desirable. Next, CSP has been proposed relatively recently and, therefore,
security issues for such a framework have been left un-addressed so far. Also, most of the
works on CSP mainly focus on deriving theoretical performance bounds under different contexts.
Despite its theoretical importance, practical implications of these bounds for system design have
not been investigated in literature. In this paper, we take some first steps in addressing these issues
for solving high dimensional signal detection problems using only compressed measurements
taking security aspects into consideration. The main contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows.
• We propose a collaborative compressive detection (CCD) framework to compensate for the
performance loss due to compression.
• We characterize the trade-off between dimensionality reduction in a universal compressive
sensing based measurement scheme and the achievable performance of CCD analytically.
• When the network operates in the presence of an eavesdropper, we employ artificial noise
injection techniques to improve secrecy performance. Theoretical performance bounds for
the scheme are also derived.
• We consider the problem of determining optimal system parameters which maximize the
detection performance at the FC, while ensuring perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the observation model and
the problem formulation. In Section III, performance of collaborative compression detection
is analyzed for both deterministic and random signal cases. In Section IV, we investigate the
problem where the network operates in the presence of an eavesdropper and propose artificial
noise injection techniques to improve secrecy performance. In Section V, we study the problem
of determining optimal system parameters which maximize the detection performance at the
FC, while ensuring perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper. Concluding remarks and possible future
directions are given in Section VI.
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(y1 = φu1) (y2 = φu2) (yN = φuN)
Fig. 1. Collaborative Compressive Detection Network
II. COLLABORATIVE COMPRESSIVE DETECTION
A. Observation Model
Consider two hypotheses H0 (signal is absent) and H1 (signal is present). Also, consider
a parallel network, comprised of a central entity (known as the FC) and a set of N nodes,
which faces the task of determining which of the two hypotheses is true (see Figure 1). Prior
probabilities of the two hypotheses H0 and H1 are denoted by P0 and P1, respectively. The
nodes observe the phenomenon (high dimensional signal), carry out local compression (low
dimensional projection), and then send their local summary statistic to the FC. The FC makes a
final decision after processing the locally compressed observations.
For the ith node observed signal, ui can be modeled as
H0 : ui = vi
H1 : ui = s+ vi
where ui is the P × 1 observation vector, s is either deterministic or random Gaussian signal
vector (not necessarily sparse) to be detected. Specifically let s ∼ N (µ, α−1IP ) and additive noise
vi ∼ N (0, β−1IP ) where x ∼ N (µ,Σ) denotes that the vector x is distributed as multivariate
Gaussian with mean vector µ and the covariance matrix Σ, and IP is the P ×P identity matrix.
Note that, the deterministic signal can be considered as a special case of the random signal s
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7with variance α−1 = 0. Observations at the nodes are assumed to be conditionally independent
and identically distributed.
Each node sends a M -length (< P ) compressed version yi of its P -length observation ui
to the FC. The collection of M -length universally sampled observations is given by, yi = φui,
where φ is an M ×P projection matrix, which is assumed to be the same for all the nodes, and
yi is the M × 1 compressed observation vector (local summary statistic).
Under the two hypotheses, the local summary statistic is
H0 : yi = φvi
H1 : yi = φs+ φvi.
The FC receives compressed observation vectors, y = [y1, · · · , yN ], from the nodes via error
free communication channels and makes the global decision about the phenomenon.
B. Binary Hypothesis Testing at the Fusion Center
We consider the detection problem in a Bayesian setup where the performance criterion at
the FC is the probability of error. The FC makes the global decision about the phenomenon by
considering the likelihood ratio test (LRT) which is given by
N∏
i=1
f1(yi)
f0(yi)
H1
≷
H0
P0
P1
. (1)
Notice that, under the two hypotheses we have the following probability density functions (PDFs);
f0(yi) =
exp(−1
2
yTi (β
−1φφT )−1yi)
|β−1φφT |1/2(2pi)M/2 , (2)
f1(yi) =
exp(−1
2
(yi − φµ)T ((α−1 + β−1)φφT )−1(yi − φµ))
|(α−1 + β−1)φφT |1/2(2pi)M/2 . (3)
After plugging in (2) and (3) in (1) and taking logarithms on both sides, we obtain an equivalent
test that simplifies to
August 27, 2018 DRAFT
8α−1
β−1
N∑
i=1
yTi (φφ
T )−1yi + 2
N∑
i=1
yTi (φφ
T )−1µ
H1
≷
H0
λ
where λ = (α−1 + β−1)
[
2 log P0
P1
+NM log
(
1 + α
−1
β−1
)]
+N(φµ)T (φφT )−1φµ.
For simplicity, we assume that P0 = P1. The test statistic for the collaborative compressive
detector can be written in a compact form as
Λ(y) =
α−1
β−1
N∑
i=1
Λ1(yi) + 2
N∑
i=1
Λ2(yi) (4)
where Λ1(yi) = yTi (φφ
T )−1yi and Λ2(yi) = yTi (φφ
T )−1µ.
We would like to point out that the test statistic for the deterministic signal and random signal
with zero mean cases can be seen as a special case of the above test statistic. More specifically,
for the deterministic signal s, the test statistic is given by Λ(y) =
N∑
i=1
Λ1(yi) and for the zero
mean random signal the test statistic is given by Λ(y) =
N∑
i=1
Λ2(yi) which is consistent with [19]
and [6].
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF COLLABORATIVE COMPRESSIVE DETECTION
First, we look at the deterministic signal case and characterize the performance of the collab-
orative compressive detector.
A. Deterministic Signal Case
The optimal test at the FC can be written in a compact form as
N∑
i=1
yTi (φφ
T )−1φs
H1
≷
H0
λ,
with λ = N
2
sTφT (φφT )−1φs. The decision statistic for the collaborative compressive detector is
given as
Λ(y) =
N∑
i=1
yTi (φφ
T )−1φs. (5)
We analytically characterize the performance of the collaborative compressive detector in terms
of the probability of error which is defined as
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9PE =
1
2
PF +
1
2
(1− PD)
where, PF = P (Λ(y) > λ|H0) and PD = P (Λ(y) > λ|H1) is the probability of false alarm and
the probability of detection, respectively. To simplify the notations, we define
Pˆ = φT (φφT )−1φ
as the orthogonal projection operator onto row space of φ. Using this notation, it is easy to show
that
Λ(y) ∼
 N (0, β−1N‖Pˆ s‖22), under H0N (N‖Pˆ s‖22, β−1N‖Pˆ s‖22) under H1
where ‖Pˆ s‖22 = sTφT (φφT )−1φs.
Thus, we have
PF = Q
(
N
2
‖Pˆ s‖22√
Nβ−1‖Pˆ s‖2
)
= Q
(
1
2
√
N
β−1
‖Pˆ s‖2
)
(6)
and
PD = Q
(
N
2
‖Pˆ s‖22 −N‖Pˆ s‖22√
Nβ−1‖Pˆ s‖2
)
= Q
(
−1
2
√
N
β−1
‖Pˆ s‖2
)
(7)
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
exp(−u2
2
) du.
The probability of error can be calculated to be
PE = Q
(
1
2
√
N
β−1
‖Pˆ s‖2
)
. (8)
Next, we derive the modified deflection coefficient (first proposed in [24]) of the system
and show its monotonic relationship with the probability of error as given in (8). The modified
deflection coefficient provides a good measure of the detection performance since it characterizes
the variance-normalized distance between the centers of two conditional PDFs. Notice that, for
the deterministic signal case, yi is distributed under the hypothesis Hj as, yi ∼ N (µij,Σij). The
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modified deflection coefficient D(y) can be obtained to be
D(y) =
N∑
i=1
(µi1 − µi0)T (Σi1)−1(µi1 − µi0)
= N
‖Pˆ s‖22
β−1
.
The monotonic relationship between PE as given in (8) and D(y) can be observed by noticing
that
PE = Q
(√
D(y)
2
)
.
Later in the paper, we will use the modified deflection coefficient to characterize the detection
performance of the system.
Notice that, the detection performance is a function of the projection operator Pˆ . In general,
this performance could be either quite good or quite poor depending on the random projection
matrix φ. Next, we provide bounds on the performance of the collaborative compressive detector
using the concept of -stable embedding.1
Definition 1. Let  ∈ (0, 1) and S,X ⊂ RP . We say that a mapping ψ is an -stable embedding
of (S,X ) if
(1− ) ‖s− x‖22 ≤ ‖ψs− ψx‖22 ≤ (1 + ) ‖s− x‖22,
for all s ∈ S and x ∈ X .
Using this concept, we state our result in the next theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose that
√
P
M
Pˆ provides an -stable embedding of (S, {0}). Then for any
deterministic signal s ∈ S, the probability of error of the collaborative compressive detector
satisfies
Q
(
√
1 + 
√
N
2
√
M
P
‖s‖2√
β−1
)
≤ PE ≤ Q
(
√
1− 
√
N
2
√
M
P
‖s‖2√
β−1
)
.
1To construct linear mappings that satisfy an -stable embedding property is beyond the scope of this work. We refer interested
readers to [4].
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Fig. 2. Prob. of error as a function of number of nodes and compression ratio c = M/P for SNR = 3dB
Proof: By our assumption that
√
P
M
Pˆ provides an -stable embedding of (S, {0}), we know
that
√
1−  ‖s‖2 ≤
√
P
M
‖Pˆ s‖2 ≤
√
1 +  ‖s‖2. (9)
Combining (9) with (8), the result follows.
For nominal values of , PE can be approximated as
PE ≈ Q
(√
N
2
√
M
P
‖s‖2√
β−1
)
.
The above expression tells us in a precise way how much information we lose by using
low dimensional projections rather than the signal samples themselves. It also tells us how
many nodes are needed to collaborate to compensate for the loss due to compression. More
specifically, if N ≥ 1
c
, where c = M
P
is defined as the compression ratio at each node, the loss
due to compression can be recovered. Notice that, for a fixed M , as the number of collaborating
nodes approaches infinity, i.e., N →∞, the probability of error vanishes. On the other hand, to
guarantee PE ≤ δ, parameters M, P and N should satisfy
cN ≥ 4
SNR
(Q−1(δ))2
where SNR = ‖s‖
2
2
β−1 .
To corroborate our theoretical results, in Figure 2 we present the behavior of PE with respect
of collaboration and compression. We plot PE as a function of the number of nodes N and
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compression ratio c. We assume that SNR = 3dB. It can be seen from Figure 2 that PE is
a monotonically decreasing function of c and N , and, therefore, the performance loss due to
compression can be compensated by exploiting spatial diversity or collaboration.
In order to more clearly illustrate the behavior of PE with respect to compression and
collaboration, we also establish the following corollary of Theorem 1 using the Chernoff Bound.
Corollary 1. Suppose that
√
P
M
Pˆ provides an -stable embedding of (S, {0}). Then for any
deterministic signal s ∈ S, we have
PE ≤ 1
2
exp
(
−1
8
cN
‖s‖22
β−1
)
.
Corollary 1 suggests that the error probability vanishes exponentially fast as we increase either
the compression ratio c or the number of collaborating nodes N .
Next, we extend the above analysis to the case where the signal of interest is a random signal
such that s ∼ N (µ, α−1IP ).
B. Random Signal with Arbitrary Mean Case
Let the signal of interest be s ∼ N (µ, α−1IP ) with an arbitrary µ. Then, the collaborative
compressive detector is given by
α−1
β−1
N∑
i=1
yTi (φφ
T )−1yi + 2
N∑
i=1
yTi (φφ
T )−1µ
H1
≷
H0
λ
where λ = (α−1 + β−1)
[
NM log
(
1 + α
−1
β−1
)]
+N(φµ)T (φφT )−1φµ. Note that, the test statistic
is of the form
N∑
i=1
[
yTi Ayi + 2b
Tyi
]
with A = α
−1
β−1 (φφ
T )−1 and b = (φφT )−1φµ. In general, it
is difficult to find the PDF of such an expression in a closed form. Next, we state a Lemma
from [25], which will be used to derive the distribution of the test statistic in a closed form.
Lemma 1 ( [25]). Let A be a symmetric matrix and x ∼ N (µ, V ), where V is positive definite
(hence nonsingular). The necessary and sufficient condition that xTAx + 2bTx + c follows a
noncentral chi-squared distribution X 2k (δ) with k degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter
δ is that
August 27, 2018 DRAFT
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
A
. .
bT
V [A : b] =
A b
bT c
 (10)
in which case k is the rank of A and δ = µTAµ+ 2bTµ+ c.
Next, using Lemma 1 we state the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For a P × P symmetric and idempotent matrix S and ui ∼ N (µ, σ2IP ),
the test statistic of the form uTi Aui + 2b
Tui + c with A = 1σ2S, b
T = 1
σ2
zTS and c =
1
σ2
zTSz follows a noncentral chi-squared distribution X 2k (δ) where k = Rank(S) and δ =
1
σ2
(
µTSµ+ 2zTSµ+ zTSz
)
for any arbitrary P × 1 vector z.
Proof: To prove the proposition, it is sufficient to show that the above mentioned A, b and
c satisfy condition (10) in Lemma 1 for any arbitrary P × 1 vector z. Notice that, S satisfies
the following properties: symmetric ST = S and idempotent S2 = S. Thus,
A
. .
bT
V [A : b] =

1
σ2
S
. . . . . .
1
σ2
zTS
 [σ2IP ]
[
1
σ2
S
...
1
σ2
Sz
]
=

Pˆ
. . . .
zTS

[
1
σ2
S
...
1
σ2
Sz
]
=
 1σ2SS 1σ2SSz
1
σ2
zTSS 1
σ2
zTSSz

=
A b
bT c

Thus, the test statistic follows a noncentral chi-squared distribution X 2k (δ) where k = Rank(S)
and δ = 1
σ2
(
µTSµ+ 2zTSµ+ zTSz
)
for any arbitrary z.
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Fig. 3. Prob of error (Pe) analysis when (α−1, β−1) = (1, 20) and P = 100. (a) Pe with varying ((c, N)) when µ = 0. (b)
Pe with varying ((c, N)) when µ = 10−3.
Using these results, the collaborative compressive detector reduces to:
α−1
β−1
N∑
i=1
yTi (φφ
T )−1yi + 2
N∑
i=1
yTi (φφ
T )−1µ
H1
≷
H0
λ.
Using the fact that yi = φui and rearranging the terms, we get
N∑
i=1
[
uTi Pˆ ui + 2
β−1
α−1
µT Pˆ ui +
(
β−1
α−1
)2
µT Pˆ µ
]
H1
≷
H0
τ
where Pˆ = φT (φφT )−1φ and τ = β
−1
α−1λ + N
(
β−1
α−1
)2
µT Pˆ µ. Note that, the FC does not have
access to ui and the above test statistic is used only for deriving the PDF of the original test
statistic.
Theorem 2. For a projection matrix Pˆ = φT (φφT )−1φ and ui ∼ N (µ, σ2kIP ) under the
hypothesis Hk, the test statistic
Λ(y) =
N∑
i=1
[
uTi Pˆ ui + 2
β−1
α−1
µT Pˆ ui +
(
β−1
α−1
)2
µT Pˆ µ
]
has the following distribution
Λ(y)
σ2k
∼
 X 2NM(δ0), under H0X 2NM(Nδ1) under H1
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where σ20 = β
−1, σ21 = α
−1 +β−1 and X 2NM(δk) denotes noncentral chi-square distribution with
NM degrees of freedom and parameters δ0 = 0 and δ1 =
||Pˆ µ||22
α−1
(
1 + β
−1
α−1
)
.
Proof: Let us denote the test static by Λ(y) =
N∑
i=1
Λ(yi) with
Λ(yi) =
[
uTi Pˆ ui + 2
β−1
α−1
µT Pˆ ui +
(
β−1
α−1
)2
µT Pˆ µ
]
.
Now notice that, Λ(yi)
σ2k
is of the form uTi Aui + 2b
Tui + c with A = Pˆσ2k , b
T = z
T Pˆ
σ2k
, z = β
−1
α−1µ
and c = z
T Pˆ z
σ2k
. Also note that, the projection matrix Pˆ = φT (φφT )−1φ is both symmetric and
idempotent with rank(Pˆ ) = M . As a result, using Proposition 1 and the fact that Λ(y)
σ2k
is the sum
of N I.I.D. chi-squared random variables Λ(yi)
σ2k
, the result in the Theorem 2 can be derived.
If NM is large enough, then, the following approximations hold
Λ(y)
σ2k
∼
 N (NM, 2NM), under H0N ((NM +Nδ1), 2(NM +Nδ1) under H1
where δ1 =
||Pˆ µ||22
α−1
(
1 + β
−1
α−1
)
. As a result, we have
PF = P
(
Λ(y)
β−1
>
τ
β−1
|H0
)
= Q
( τ
β−1 −NM√
2NM
)
and
PD = P
(
Λ(y)
α−1 + β−1
>
τ
α−1 + β−1
|H1
)
= Q
(
τ
α−1+β−1 −NM −Nδ1√
2(NM +Nδ1)
)
where τ = β
−1
α−1λ + N
(
β−1
α−1
)2
||Pˆ µ||22, λ = (α−1 + β−1)
[
NM log
(
1 + α
−1
β−1
)]
+ N ||Pˆ µ||22 and
δ1 =
||Pˆ µ||22
α−1
(
1 + β
−1
α−1
)
.
The detection performance of the system is a function of the projection operator Pˆ . Next, we
provide approximations to the performance of the collaborative compressive detector using the
concept of -stable embedding of the mean µ.
Theorem 3. Suppose that
√
P
M
Pˆ provides an -stable embedding of (U , {0}). Then for any
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random signal s ∼ N (µ, α−1IP ) with µ ∈ U , the probability of error of the collaborative
compressive detector can be approximated as
PE =
1
2
Q
(√
cNτ0
)
+
1
2
(
Q
(√
cNτ1
))
where τ0 =
√
P
2
(
(1 + τ−1)
(
log (1 + τ) +
‖µ‖22
α−1P
)
− 1
)
, τ1 =
√
P+δ′1
2
(
1−
τ−1
(
P log(1+τ)+
‖µ‖22
α−1
)
P+δ′1
)
with δ′1 =
‖µ‖22
α−1 (1 + τ
−1) and τ = α
−1
β−1 .
Proof: By our assumption that
√
P
M
Pˆ provides an -stable embedding of (U , {0}), we know
that
√
1−  ‖µ‖2 ≤
√
P
M
‖Pˆ µ‖2 ≤
√
1 +  ‖µ‖2. (11)
In other words, for large values of NM the following approximation holds: |Pˆ µ‖22 ≈ MP ‖µ‖22 =
c‖µ‖22. The proof follows from the fact that Q(x) = 1−Q(−x) and by plugging in
PF = Q
(√
cNτ0
)
(12)
and
PD = Q
(
−
√
cNτ1
)
(13)
in the equation PE =
1
2
PF +
1
2
(1− PD), the above results can be derived.
Note that, (−τ1) ≤ τ0 and, therefore, PD ≥ PF . Similar to the deterministic signal case, if
N ≥ c−1 the loss due to compression with a single node can be recovered in collaborative
compressive detection for the random signal case as well. For a fixed M , as the number of
collaborating nodes approaches infinity, i.e., N → ∞, the probability of error vanishes. We
would like to point out that by plugging in µ = 0 in the above expressions, results for the zero
mean signal case can be derived (which are consistent with [6], [9]).
To gain insights into Theorem 3, we present illustrative examples that corroborate our results.
In Figure 3(a) we plot the probability of error PE as a function of the number of nodes N
and compression ratio c. We assume that the signal of interest is s ∼ N (0, IP ) and noise
vi ∼ N (0, 20IP ), with original length of the signal being P = 100. It can be seen from the
figure that PE is a monotonically decreasing function of (c,N). In Figure 3(b), we plot the
probability of error PE as a function of (c,N) when the signal of interest is s ∼ N (µ, IP ) with
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‖µ‖22 = 10−3. Similar to Figure 3(b), PE decreases monotonically with (c,N), however, with a
much faster rate. In order to more clearly illustrate this behavior of PE , we also establish the
following corollary of Theorem 3.
Corollary 2. Suppose that
√
P
M
Pˆ provides an -stable embedding of (U , {0}). Then for any
random signal s ∼ N (µ, α−1IP ) with µ ∈ U , the error probability PE of the collaborative
compressive detector satisfies
PE ≤ 1
4
exp
(
−cN
2
τ 20
)
+
1
4
exp
(
−cN
2
τ 21
)
.
Proof: To prove the corollary, we first show that both τ0 and τ1 as given in Theorem 3 are
positive. Let us denote by τk(µ = 0) the expression when µ = 0 is plugged in the expression for
τk for k ∈ {0, 1}. Then, it can be shown that τk ≥ τk(µ = 0) for k ∈ {0, 1}. Now, a sufficient
condition for τk > 0 is τk(µ = 0) > 0 for k ∈ {0, 1}. The condition for τ0(µ = 0) > 0 and
τ1(µ = 0) > 0 to be true can be written as
1
1 + β
−1
α−1
< log
(
1 +
α−1
β−1
)
<
α−1
β−1
.
The above condition can be shown to be true by applying the logarithm inequality τ
1+τ
<
log(1 + τ) < τ with τ = α
−1
β−1 . Now using the Chernoff bound (i.e., Q(x) ≤ 12 exp(−x
2
2
) for
x > 0), it can be shown that
PE ≤ 1
4
exp
(
−cN
2
τ 20
)
+
1
4
exp
(
−cN
2
τ 21
)
.
The above expression suggests that PE vanishes exponentially fast as we increase either the
compression ratio c or the number of collaborating nodes N .
Next, we consider the problem where the network operates in the presence of an eavesdropper
who wants to discover the state of the nature being monitored by the system. The FC’s goal
is to implement the appropriate countermeasures to keep the data regarding the presence of the
phenomenon secret from the eavesdropper.
IV. COLLABORATIVE COMPRESSIVE DETECTION IN THE PRESENCE OF AN EAVESDROPPER
In a collaborative compressive detection framework, the FC receives compressed observation
vectors, y = [y1, · · · , yN ], from the nodes and makes the global decision about the presence of
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Fig. 4. Collaborative Compressive Detection Network in the Presence of an Eavesdropper
the random signal vector2 s ∼ N (µ, α−1IP ) with µ 6= 0. The transmission of the nodes, however,
may be observed by an eavesdropper who also wants to discover the state of the phenomenon
(see Figure 4). To keep the data regarding the presence of the phenomenon secret from the
eavesdropper, we propose to use cooperating trustworthy nodes that assist the FC by injecting
artificial noise to mislead the eavesdroppers to improve the security performance of the system.
A. Artificial Noise Injection Model
It is assumed that B out of N nodes (or α fraction of the nodes) inject artificial noise according
to the model given next. Nodes tamper their data yi and send y˜i in the following manner:
Under H0:
y˜i =

φ(vi +Wi) with probability P 01
φ(vi −Wi) with probability P 02
φvi with probability (1− P 01 − P 02 )
Under H1:
2In rest of the paper, we will consider only the random signal detection case. Deterministic signal can be seen as a special
case of random signal s with variance α−1 = 0 and results for the deterministic signal case can be obtained by plugging in
α−1 = 0 in corresponding expressions for the random signal case.
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y˜i =

φ(s+ vi +Wi) with probability P 11
φ(s+ vi −Wi) with probability P 12
φ(s+ vi) with probability (1− P 11 − P 12 )
where the signal s is assumed to be distributed as s ∼ N (µ, α−1IP ) and Wi is the artificial
noise injected in the system which is distributed as AWGN Wi ∼ N (Di, γ−1IP ) with Di = κµ.
The parameter κ > 0 represents the artificial noise strength, which is zero for non artificial
noise injecting nodes. Also note that, the values of (P 01 , P
0
2 ) and (P
1
1 , P
1
2 ) are system dependent.
For example, under the assumption that the noise injecting nodes have perfect knowledge of the
hypothesis, we have P 01 = 1 and P
1
2 = 1. In other scenarios, values of (P
0
1 , P
0
2 ) and (P
1
1 , P
1
2 ) are
constrained by the local detection capability of the nodes. However, it is reasonable to assume
that (P 01 > P
0
2 ) and (P
1
1 < P
1
2 ) because under hypothesis H0 the tampered value should be high
and under H1 the tampered value should be low to degrade the performance at the eavesdropper.
We assume that the observation model and artificial noise parameters (i.e., κ and γ−1) are known
to both the FC and the eavesdropper. The only information unavailable at the eavesdropper is
the identity of the noise injecting nodes (Byzantines) and considers each node i to be Byzantine
with a certain probability α.
B. Binary Hypothesis Testing
The FC can distinguish between yi and y˜i. Notice that, y˜i is distributed under the hypothesis H0
as a multivariate Gaussian mixture N (P 0k , µ˜0i, Σ˜0
i
) which comes from N (φDi, (γ−1 +β−1)φφT )
with probability P 01 , from N (−φDi, (γ−1 +β−1)φφT ) with probability P 02 and from N (0, (γ−1 +
β−1)φφT ) with probability (1−P 01 −P 02 ). Similarly, under the hypothesis H1 it is distributed as
multivariate Gaussian mixture N (P 1k , µ˜1i, Σ˜1
i
) which comes from N (φ(µ + Di), (α−1 + γ−1 +
β−1)φφT ) with probability P 11 , from N (φ(µ−Di), (α−1 + γ−1 + β−1)φφT ) with probability P 12
and from N (φµ, (α−1 + γ−1 + β−1)φφT ) with probability (1 − P 11 − P 12 ). The FC makes the
global decision about the phenomenon by considering the likelihood ratio test (LRT) which is
given by
B∏
i=1
f1(y˜i)
f0(y˜i)
N∏
i=B+1
f1(yi)
f0(yi)
H1
≷
H0
P0
P1
(14)
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where B/N = α. The eavesdropper is assumed to be unaware of the identity of the noise
injecting Byzantines and considers each node i to be Byzantine with a certain probability α.
Thus, the distribution of the data yˆi at the eavesdropper under hypothesis Hj can be approximated
as IID multivariate Gaussian mixture with the same Gaussian parameters N (µ˜j i, Σ˜j i) as above,
however, with rescaled mixing probabilities (αP j1 , αP
j
2 , 1−αP j1−αP j2 ). The eavesdropper makes
the global decision about the phenomenon by considering the likelihood ratio test (LRT) which
is given by
N∏
i=1
f1(yˆi)
f0(yˆi)
H1
≷
H0
P0
P1
. (15)
Analyzing the performance of the likelihood ratio detector in (14) and (15) in a closed form is
difficult in general. Thus, we use the modified deflection coefficient [24] in lieu of the probability
of error of the system. Deflection coefficient reflects the output signal to noise ratio and widely
used in optimizing the performance of detection systems. As stated earlier, the modified deflection
coefficient is defined as
D(yi) = (µ
i
1 − µi0)T (Σi1)−1(µi1 − µi0)
where µij and Σ
i
j are the mean and the covariance matrix of yi under the hypothesis Hj ,
respectively. Using these notations, the modified deflection coefficient at the FC can be written
as
D(FC) = BD(y˜i) + (N −B)D(yi).
Dividing both sides of the above equation by N , we get
DFC = αD(y˜i) + (1− α)D(yi)
where DFC =
D(FC)
N
and will be used as the performance metric as a surrogate for the probability
of error. Similarly, the modified deflection coefficient at the eavesdropper can be written as
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Fig. 5. Modified Deflection Coefficient analysis. (a) DFC with varying c and κ. (b) DEV with varying c and κ.
DEV =
D(EV )
N
= D(yˆi).
V. SYSTEM DESIGN WITH PHYSICAL LAYER SECRECY GUARANTEES
Notice that, both DFC and DEV are functions of the compression ratio c and artificial noise
injection parameters (α,Wi) which are under the control of the FC. This motivates us to obtain
the optimal values of system parameters under a physical layer secrecy constraint. The problem
can be formally stated as:
maximize
c,α,Wi
αD(y˜i) + (1− α)D(yi)
subject to D(yˆi) ≤ τ
(16)
where c = M/P is the compression ratio. We refer to D(yˆi) ≤ τ , where τ ≥ 0, as the physical
layer secrecy constraint which reflects the security performance of the system. The case where
τ = 0, or equivalently D(yˆi) = 0, is referred to as the perfect secrecy constraint. In the wiretap
channel literature, it is typical to consider the maximum degree of information achieved by the
main user (FC), while the information of the eavesdropper is exactly zero. This is commonly
referred to as the perfect secrecy regime [26]. Next, we derive closed form expressions of the
modified deflection coefficients at both the FC and the eavesdropper.
A. Performance Analysis of Collaborative Compressive Detection with an Eavesdropper
First, we derive closed form expressions of the modified deflection coefficients at the FC.
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Fig. 6. Modified Deflection Coefficient analysis. (a) DFC with varying α and κ. (b) DEV with varying α and κ.
1) A Closed Form Expression of the Modified Deflection Coefficient at the FC: As stated
earlier, the modified deflection coefficient at the FC is
DFC = αD(y˜i) + (1− α)D(yi).
It can be shown that
D(yi) =
‖Pˆ µ‖22
γ−1 + β−1
,
where Pˆ = φT (φφT )φ.
Next, to derive D(y˜i), observe that y˜i is distributed as a multivariate Gaussian mixture with
µ˜i0 = (P
0
1 − P 02 )φDi
µ˜i1 = (P
1
1 − P 12 )φDi + φµ
Σ˜i1 = σ
2φφT +
3∑
j=1
P 1j (µ˜
i
1(j)− µ˜i1)(µ˜i1(j)− µ˜i1)T
where µ˜i1(1) = φ(µ + Di), µ˜
i
1(2) = φ(µ − Di), µ˜i1(3) = φµ, P 13 = 1 − P 11 − P 12 and
σ2 = (α−1 + β−1 + γ−1). After some derivation, it can be shown that
Σ˜i1 = σ
2φφT + Pt[φDiD
T
i φ
T ]
where Pt = P 11 +P
1
2 − (P 11 −P 12 )2. Also, notice that Σ˜i1 is of the form A+ bbT . Now, using the
Sherman-Morrison formula [27], its inverse can be obtained to be
(Σ˜i1)
−1 =
(φφT )−1
σ2
− Pt(φφ
T )−1φDiDTi φ
T (φφT )−1
σ4 + σ2PtDTi φ
T (φφT )−1φDi
(17)
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with σ2 = (α−1 + β−1 + γ−1).
Also,
(µ˜i1 − µ˜i0) = φµ− PbφDi (18)
where Pb = (P 01 − P 02 ) + (P 12 − P 11 ). Using (17), (18) and the fact that Di = κµ where κ is
referred to as the noise strength, the modified deflection coefficient D(y˜i) can be derived to be3
D(y˜i) = (1− Pbκ)2‖Pˆ µ‖
2
2
σ2
− Ptγ2(1− Pbκ)2‖Pˆ µ‖
4
2
σ2rb
(19)
where rb = σ2 + Ptκ2‖Pˆ µ‖22 and σ2 = (α−1 + β−1 + γ−1).
Proposition 2. Suppose that
√
P
M
Pˆ provides an -stable embedding of (U , {0}). Then the
modified deflection coefficient at the FC for any µ ∈ U can be approximated as
DFC ≈ α (1− Pbκ)
2
κ2Pt + c−1 σ
2
‖µ‖22
+ (1− α)c‖µ‖
2
2
σ2
(20)
where
Pb = (P
0
1 − P 02 ) + (P 12 − P 11 ), Pt = P 11 + P 12 − (P 11 − P 12 )2 and σ2 = (α−1 + β−1 + γ−1).
Proof: Using the fact that
√
P
M
Pˆ provides an -stable embedding of (U, {0}), for any µ ∈ U ,
D(yi) and D(y˜i) can be approximated as
D(yi) =
M
P
‖µ‖22
σ2
D(y˜i) =
M
P
‖µ‖22
σ2
(1− Pbκ)2
(
1− M
P
‖µ‖22
rb
κ2Pt
)
where rb = σ2 + Ptκ2‖Pˆ µ‖22 and σ2 = (α−1 + β−1 + γ−1). Plugging in the above values in
DFC = αD(y˜i) + (1− α)D(yi) yields the desired result.
Next, we derive the modified deflection coefficient at the eavesdropper.
2) A Closed Form Expression of the Modified Deflection Coefficients at the Eavesdropper:
As stated earlier, the modified deflection coefficient of the eavesdropper is
DEV = D(yˆi).
3For µ = 0, DFC ≈ α P
2
b
Pt+
σ2
‖Pˆd‖
where Di = d,∀i.
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Next, to derive D(yˆi), observe that yˆi is distributed as a multivariate Gaussian mixture with
µˆi0 = α(P
0
1 − P 02 )φDi
µˆi1 = α(P
1
1 − P 12 )φDi + φµ
Σˆi1 = σ
2φφT +
3∑
j=1
p1j(µˆ
i
1(j)− µˆi1)(µˆi1(j)− µˆi1)T
with µˆi1(1) = φ(µ + Di), µˆ
i
1(2) = φ(µ − Di), µˆi1(3) = φµ, p11 = αP 11 , p12 = αP 12 , p13 =
1−α(P 11 −P 12 ) and σ2 = (α−1 + γ−1 +β−1). Using these values, we state our result in the next
proposition.4
Proposition 3. Suppose that
√
P
M
Pˆ provides an -stable embedding of (U , {0}). Then, the
modified deflection coefficient at the eavesdropper for any µ ∈ U can be approximated as
DEV ≈ (1− αPbκ)
2
ακ2PEt + c
−1 σ2
‖µ‖22
(21)
where
Pb = (P
0
1 − P 02 ) + (P 12 − P 11 ), PEt = P 11 + P 12 − α(P 11 − P 12 )2 and σ2 = (α−1 + β−1 + γ−1).
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 and is, therefore, omitted.
In general, there is a trade-off between the detection performance and the security performance
of the system. To gain insights into this trade-off, in Figure 5 we plot the modified deflection
coefficient, both at the FC and at the eavesdropper, as a function of compression ratio (c) and
noise strength (κ) when α = 0.3, P 01 = P
1
2 = 0.8, P
0
2 = P
1
1 = 0.1 and
‖µ‖22
σ2
= 3. Next, in
Figure 6 we plot the modified deflection coefficient, both at the FC and at the eavesdropper,
as a function of the fraction of artificial noise injecting nodes (α) and noise strength (κ) when
P 01 = P
1
2 = 0.8, P
0
2 = P
1
1 = 0.1 and
M
P
‖µ‖22
σ2
= 3. It can be seen from Figure 5 and Figure 6
that DFC and DEV do not exhibit nice properties (monotonicity or convexity) with respect to
the system parameters and, therefore, it is not an easy task to design the system parameters
under an arbitrary physical layer secrecy constraint. Also notice that, a specific case where the
eavesdropper is completely blind deserves particular attention. This is referred to as the perfect
4For µ = 0, DEV ≈ (αPb)
2
αPEt +
σ2
‖Pˆd‖
where Di = d,∀i.
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secrecy regime, i.e., DEV = 0. In the next subsection, we explore the problem of system design in
a holistic manner in the perfect secrecy regime. More specifically, we are interested in analyzing
the behavior of the modified deflection coefficient, both at the FC and at the eavesdropper, as a
function of compression ratio (c = M/P ) and artificial noise injection parameters (α,Wi).
B. Optimal System Design Under Perfect Secrecy Constraint
The goal of the designer is to maximize the detection performance DFC , while ensuring
perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper. The system design problem under perfect secrecy constraint
can be formally stated as:
maximize
c,α,Wi
αD(y˜i) + (1− α)D(yi)
subject to D(yˆi) = 0
(22)
where c is the compression ratio and (α, Wi) are the artificial noise injection parameters. This
reduction of the search space, which arises as a natural consequence of the perfect secrecy
constraint, has the additional benefit of simplifying the mathematical analysis. Next, we first
explore the answer to the question: Does compression help in improving the security performance
of the system?
1) Does Compression Help?: We first consider the case where αPbκ 6= 1. In this regime,
for fixed values of α, Pb and κ, the modified deflection coefficient, both at the FC and the
eavesdropper, is a monotonically increasing function of the compression ratio. In other words,
dDFC
dc
> 0 and dDEV
dc
> 0. This suggests that compression improves the security performance at
the expense of detection performance. More specifically, the FC would decrease the compression
ratio until the physical layer secrecy constraint is satisfied. As a consequence, it will result in
performance loss at the FC due to compression. In other words, there is a trade-off between
the detection performance and the security performance of the system. Observe that, DEV = 0
if and only if αPbκ = 1 (ignoring the extreme conditions such as c = 0 or κ = ∞) and, in
this regime, DFC is a monotonically increasing function of the compression ratio c and DEV
is independent of the compression ratio c. These results are summarized in the the following
proposition.
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Fig. 7. Modified Deflection Coefficient as a function of α and compression ratio c = M/P for SNR = 5dB in perfect secrecy
regime.
Proposition 4. In the perfect secrecy regime (i.e., αPbκ = 1), DFC is a monotonically increasing
function of the compression ratio c and DEV is independent of the compression ratio c. When
αPbκ 6= 1, the modified deflection coefficient, both at the FC and the eavesdropper, is a
monotonically increasing function of the compression ratio.
As mentioned above, in the perfect secrecy regime DEV is independent of the compression
ratio c and the network designer can fix c = cmax, where the value of cmax may be dependent
on the application of interest. The system design problem under perfect secrecy constraint can
be reformulated as
arg max
α,Wi
DFC(cmax, κ = 1/(Pbα)). (23)
Next, we analyze the behavior of the DFC(cmax, κ = 1/(Pbα)) as a function of artificial noise
injection parameters (α,Wi).
2) Optimal Artificial Noise Injection Parameters:
Proposition 5. In the high signal to noise ratio regime (defined as ‖µ‖
2
2
σ2
>
P 2b
Pt
where σ2 =
(α−1 + γ−1 + β−1)), the modified deflection coefficient at the FC, DFC , is a monotonically
decreasing function of the fraction of data falsifying nodes (0 < α ≤ 1) under the perfect
secrecy constraint.
Proof: Deflection coefficient at the FC under the perfect secrecy constraint can be expressed
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as
DFC(cmax, κ = 1/(Pbα)) =
α(1− 1
α
)2
Pt
α2P 2b
+ 1
D
+ (1− α)D
with D = cmax
‖µ‖22
σ2
. Now, deriving the derivative of DFC with respect to α results in
dDFC
dα
=
PtP
2
bD
2(1− 4α+ α2)−DP 4b α2 − P 2t D3
(PtD + α2P 2b )
2
.
Next, we show that dDFC
dα
< 0.
First, let us define F (α) = x+ α2 1
x
− (1 + α2). It is easy to show that F (α) is a decreasing
function of α if x > 1. This also implies that F (α) > 0 if and only if F (α = 1) > 0⇔ (x+ 1
x
) >
2. Note that, (x+ 1
x
) > 2, which follows from the fact that arithmetic mean is greater than the
geometric mean. Having shown that F (α) > 0, we return back to showing that dDFC
dα
< 0. We
start with the inequality
x+ α2
1
x
− (1 + α2) > 0
⇔ x+ α2 1
x
> (1 + α2)
⇒ 4α
(1 + α2)
+
x
(1 + α2)
+
α2
(1 + α2)
1
x
> 1
Now, if we plug in x = D Pt
P 2B
in the above inequality and rearrange the terms we get
PtP
2
bD
2(1− 4α+ α2)−DP 4b α2 − P 2t D3
(PtD + α2P 2b )
2
< 0
which is true if x = D Pt
P 2B
> 1.
Notice that, Proposition 4 suggests that to maximize the modified deflection coefficient DFC
under the perfect secrecy constraint (22), the network designer should choose the value of α as
low as possible under the constraint that α > 0 and accordingly increase κ to satisfy αPbκ = 1.
In practice, αmin may be dependent on the application of interest.
Next, to gain insights into Proposition 4 and 5, we present illustrative examples that corroborate
our results. In Figure 7, we plot DFC as a function of fraction of noise injection nodes α and
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Fig. 8. Modified Deflection Coefficient as a function of γ−1 in perfect secrecy regime.
compression ratio c in the perfect secrecy regime when P 01 = P
1
2 = 0.8, P
0
2 = P
1
1 = 0.1 and
‖µ‖22
σ2
= 5dB. It can be seen from the figure that DFC is a monotonically increasing function of
c and a monotonically decreasing function of α.
Next, we analyze the behavior of DFC as a function of artificial noise variance γ−1. This
analysis will help us in determining the optimal artificial noise injection parameters.
Proposition 6. In the high signal to noise ratio regime (defined as ‖µ‖
2
2
σ2
>
P 2b
Pt
where σ2 =
(α−1 + γ−1 +β−1)) with perfect secrecy constraint (i.e., αPbκ = 1), the optimal artificial noise
is a deterministic signal with value µ
αminPb
, i.e., fWi(wi) = δ(wi − µαminPb ).
Proof: The proof follows from Proposition 5 and the fact that DFC is a monotonically
decreasing function of the variance γ−1 of the artificial noise, i.e., dDFC
dγ−1 < 0.
In Figure 8, we plot the modified deflection coefficient at the FC as a function of the variance
of the artificial noise when P 01 = P
1
2 = 0.8, P
0
2 = P
1
1 = 0.1 and (c, α) = (0.2, 0.3). We assume
that the signal of interest is s ∼ N (µ, IP ) with ‖µ‖22 = 5 and noise vi ∼ N (0, 10IP ). It can be
seen that DFC is a monotonically decreasing function of the artificial noise variance γ−1. This
observation implies that the optimal artificial noise is a deterministic signal. Using these results,
the solution of the optimization problem (22) is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. To maximize the modified deflection coefficient at the FC under the perfect secrecy
constraint, the network designer should choose c = cmax, α = αmin and deterministic artificial
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noise with value µ
αminPb
.
Notice that, Theorem 4 suggests that to maximize the modified deflection coefficient DFC
under the perfect secrecy constraint (22), the network designer should choose the value of α as
low as possible under the constraint that α > 0 and accordingly increase κ to satisfy αPbκ = 1.
Also, the optimal artificial noise is a deterministic signal with value µ
αminPb
, i.e., fWi(wi) =
δ(wi − µαminPb ).
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We considered the problem of collaborative compressive detection under a physical layer
secrecy constraint. First, we proposed the collaborative compressive detection framework and
showed that through collaboration the loss due to compression when using a single node can
be recovered. Second, we studied the problem where the network works in the presence of an
eavesdropper. We proposed the use of artificial noise injection techniques to improve security
performance. We also considered the problem of determining optimal system parameters which
maximize the detection performance at the FC, while ensuring perfect secrecy at the eavesdrop-
per. Optimal system parameters with perfect secrecy guarantees were obtained in a closed form.
There are still many interesting questions that remain to be explored in the future work such
as an analysis of the problem in scenarios where the perfect secrecy constraint is relaxed. Note
that, some analytical methodologies used in this paper are certainly exploitable for studying more
general detection problems such as detection of non Gaussian signals in correlated noise. Other
questions such as the case where communication channels are noisy can also be investigated.
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